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Abstract
This notes shows how intertemporal and cross-section welfare are related
in a general class of stochastic continuous time models. In the steady
state intertemporal welfare is shown to be proportional to cross-sectional
income. This result holds for economies where each agent maximizes his
own expected discounted utility. That is, we do not assume that aggregate
utility is maximized. We provide an application to search in the labor
market and one to pollution externalities.
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1. Introduction
Welfare at an aggregate economic level can be thought of as the sum of incomes in
the economy, or as the expected discounted value of future income °ows. Both in
theory and practice the distinction between essentially static concepts of income
and inherently intertemporal welfare concepts plays a role. Since future levels of
income are unobservable, operational national accounting systems are necessar-
ily based on static cross-sectional income measures. Also in theoretical models,
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possible by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.income is often easier to calculate than intertemporal measures of welfare. Yet,
in a dynamic world with changes of income levels and agents moving between
sectors over time, intertemporal welfare measures seem more relevant. This paper
investigates the link between the two concepts.
Three basic questions motivate this note. First, can we construct a measure
of intertemporal welfare based on observable contemporanous variables alone?
This would help us in using national accounts to measure intertemporal welfare.
Second, can we exploit the relationship between income and welfare to analyse
intertemporal welfare in theoretical models? Avoiding the explicit calculation
of intertemporal welfare may simplify the analysis. Third, is it allowed to infer
from changes in current income how welfare has changed? This would help us for
example to evaluate the desirability of economic growth and economic policies.
It should be noted that, in principle, there is no relationship between the °ow
on a certain moment and the sum of °ows over time. That is, if income tomorrow
is higher than today, we cannot expect welfare to be higher tomorrow than today.
The basic reason is of course that we need to know all relevant °ows to calculate
welfare, instead of just two of them (that of today and tomorrow). To take an
extreme case, if the day after tomorrow an earthquake destroys everything, welfare
tomorrow will be lower than welfare from the point of today, despite the fact that
income today was lower.
However, in certain speci¯c cases, something can be said about the connec-
tion between static and dynamic concepts of welfare. The extensive literature on
Green Accounting (summarized in Aronsson and Loefgren 1998) has focussed on
cases in which agents face the same trade-o® between the di®erent actions they
can undertake, no matter at which moment in time they have to decide. For
example, investing a certain amount starting from a certain level of the relevant
capital stocks yields the same future returns, no matter in which period we face
this investment decision. (Technological progress that arises exogenously over
time would destroy this property). Weitzman (1976) showed that in a ¯rst-best
optimal economy with representative consumers, Net National Income is directly
proportional to the present value of future utility. Later papers show how Net
National Income has to be augmented, using observable variables, to re°ect in-
tertemporal welfare, if the environment or natural resources play a role in the
economic system (see, e.g. Vellinga and Withagen 1996).
We also focus on similar special cases and explore the connection between
income levels and welfare. We derive a relationship between the two that holds
for both distorted economies and economies in which welfare is maximal (¯rst-
2best economies). Doing so, we use a di®erent method than the green accounting
literature which concentrates on the latter type of economies. This literature
shows the equivalence between income, welfare and the current value Hamiltonion
for welfare maximization. It has few things to say about distorted economies
except from the statement that the Hamiltonian for these economies should be
augmented by a complicated term to ¯nd the welfare index. The reason is that
the Hamiltonian is set up for welfare maximization while welfare maximization
does not take place in a distorted economy. By contrast, we do not rely on the
Hamiltonian but directly look at welfare and ¯nd a simpler and more intuitive
welfare index for distorted economies that is in fact the natural counterpart to
that for the ¯rst-best economy.
We ¯nd that income and welfare are related in an easily interpretable way.
Our result can be directly applied to labour market models in the spirit of e.g.
Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), as shown in the next section. However, increases
in income cannot be unambiguously related to increases in welfare, even not if the
economy is on a ¯rst-best growth path. The reason is that a parameter change
might not only a®ect income and hence welfare, but might also change the factor
of proportionality between income and welfare.
The next section gives a simple example to illustrate the analysis here. Section
3 outlines the general model and proves the proportionality claim. In Section 4,
we relate our results to the green accounting literature.
2. Simple Example
This section illustrates our analysis using a simple version of the Mortensen Pis-
sarides framework. This type of model is often used now in labor economics. For
a survey, see Mortensen and Pissarides (1998).
Let Vu (Ve) denote the value to a worker of being unemployed (employed). An
employed worker receives a wage w. An unemployed worker receives unemploy-
ment insurance equal to b ¹ w where b 2 [0;1i is the replacement rate in terms of
the economy wide average wage ¹ w.
Agents are represented on the unit interval [0;1]. Let u 2 h0;1i denote
the fraction of unemployed agents and v > 0 the number of vacancies posted
by ¯rms. Then each period m(u;v) > 0 of the unemployed agents and va-








@v2 < 0. Further, m(:;:) is homogenous of degree 1 in u and v.
The probability that an unemployed worker is matched with a vacancy equals
3m(u;v)
u = m(1;µ) ´ m(µ) where µ ´ v
u equals the labor market tightness. Finally,
assume that with an exogenous probability ± a match between a worker and ¯rm
is dissolved and the worker becomes unemployed.
Then in steady state it is the case that
½Vu = b¹ w + m(µ)(Ve ¡ Vu)
½Ve = w + ±(Vu ¡ Ve)
where ½ > 0 denotes the discount rate.
Turning to the demand side of the labor market, let Je denote the value for a
¯rm of employing an agent. Jv denotes the value of creating a vacancy. A ¯rm
matched with a worker produces a °ow of y units of output and pays the worker a
wage w. Further, posting a vacancy entails a °ow cost of c units of output y. The





a match is dissolved, the ¯rm posts a vacancy again. Hence, in steady state we
¯nd




½Je = y ¡ w + ±(Jv ¡ Je)
We assume that there is free entry into vacancy creation and hence Jv = 0.
In these models, it is often assumed that the wage is determined by the Nash
bargaining function. That is,
w = argmax
w0 (Ve ¡ Vu)
¯ (Je ¡ Jv)
1¡¯
where ¯ (1 ¡ ¯) denotes the bargaining power of the employee (employer) and
Vu (Jv) is the fall back position of the employee (employer) in case bargaining
















@w = 0 because the replacement rate b is in terms of the economy average
wage ¹ w ´
R
a wa
1¡u (where the integration is over all employed agents) on which the
e®ect of the agent's wage wa is negligible. In equilibrium all wages are the same
and hence ¹ w = w. Solving for the wage yields
w = ¯y + (1 ¡ ¯)½Vu
4Thus the higher a worker's bargaining power ¯ the bigger the share he gets from
the production surplus y.
For given value of µ, unemployment u changes over time according to
_ u = ±(1 ¡ u) ¡ m(µ)u
where ±(1 ¡ u) equals the °ow from employment into unemployment and m(µ)u
equals the °ow from unemployment into employment. Hence in steady state where









































































A weighted average of value functions can be quite a complicated expression. The








0 + (1 ¡ u
0)(w














1In fact, it is straightforward to solve for these variables explicitly, but we do not need that
here.
5which is a weighted average of per period (static) pay o®s.
Finally, Mortensen and Pissarides (1995) analyze a version of this model with
























Welfare at time t can now be de¯ned as
W(t) ´ u(t)Vu(t) + (1 ¡ u(t))(Ve(t) + Je(t)) + v(t)Jv(t) + _ W(t)
where _ W(t) =
dW(t)
dt . We show that in steady state (de¯ned precisely below),











So, again, we ¯nd in steady state a simple relation between intertemporal welfare
and per period (static) pay o®s. The next section shows this result to be true for
a more general model.
3. The General Model
Consider a group of agents a 2 [0;1] each of which can at each moment in time
be in one of S states s 2 f1;2;:::;Sg. In state s at time t agent a can choose an
action from his action space Xs, that is xa;t 2 Xs. Together with the actions x¡a;t
of the other agents, this action a®ects his pay o® in state s, ps(xa;t;x¡a;t;Á) ¸ 0,
and his transition rate from state s to state s0; ms;s0(xa;t;x¡a;t). Pay o®s (but
not transition rates) are directly a®ected by parameter Á. One can think of
Á as a tax parameter. By imposing taxes, governments directly a®ect pay o®s
6but only indirectly a®ect transition rates via actions (xa;x¡a). The model is
in continuous time, hence ms;s0(xa;t;x¡a;t) ¸ 0 are Poisson arrival rates. The
following assumption de¯nes states in such a way that agents within the same
state are homogenous2 in terms of the consequences of their actions.










a 6= a0;a00 and each s and s0.
The assumption implies that we focus on the symmetric equilibrium where all
agents in the same state s choose (with probability 1) the same action, denoted







ms;s0(xa;x¡a;t)(Vs0;t ¡ Vs;t) + _ Vs;tg (3.1)
where ½ > 0 denotes the discount factor and _ Vs;t =
dVs;t
dt . Thus the expected
present value of being in state s at time t is the sum of three terms: the direct
pay o® received in state s, the sum of transition probabilities from state s to state
s0 in which case the agent will receive Vs0;t instead of Vs;t and the change in the
value Vs;t over time.
To simplify notation, let ps;t ´ ps(xa;t;x¡a;t;Á) denote the pay o®s and ms;s0;t ´
ms;s0(xa;t;x¡a;t) the transition rates in state s at time t that follow from the
Bellman equation (3.1) in a symmetric equilibrium.
De¯nition 3.1. De¯ne intertemporal welfare at time t as the weighted average
of the value functions Vs;t in the states at time t with the weights equal to the





That is, we use a utilitarian welfare function. In other words, the welfare
function does not introduce distributive considerations in addition to the ones
implicit in the pay o® function ps;t. In particular, agents may be risk averse in the
sense that the pay o® function ps;t is a concave function of the income received in
state s at time t.
We now consider in turn (i) how welfare is related to pay o®s in general, (ii)
how they are related in the steady state and (iii) how changes in steady state
welfare and pay o®s as a result of a change in Á are related.
2Below we argue that this approach can be extended to the case of heterogenous agents.
73.1. The proportionality between Welfare and Income
In the following proposition we state how welfare and pay-o®s are related:




Proof. It turns out that the proposition is most easily proved using matrix
notation. De¯ne a matrix At as aii;t = ¡
P
j6=i mi;j;t and aij;t = mi;j;t i 6= j. Then
one can see that
PS
j=1aij;t = 0: It follows that over time the number of agents
in the states evolves as _ nt = AT
t nt; where nt = (n1;t;n2;t;:::nS;t)T: Let Vt denote
the vector of values Vt = (V1;t;V2;t;:::VS;t)T and Pt the vector of per period pay
o®s Pt = (p1;t;p2;t;:::pS;t)T and I the identity matrix. Then equation (3.1) can be
written as
(½I ¡ At)Vt= Pt+ _ Vt (3.2)
With this notation we want to prove that
n
T
















t _ Vt+_ n
T
t Vt
Using equation (3.2) and _ nt = AT
t nt this can be written as
n
T








This proposition has a clear interpretation. The right hand side of the equality
in the proposition represents income, consisting of a consumption term (the sum
of pay-o®s over all individuals) and an investment term (increase in intertemporal
welfare). The left hand side is a term proportional to intertemporal welfare.
Accordingly, if income is measured appropriately, it is equivalent to the stream of
interest from intertemporal welfare, the interest rate being ½.





dt = 0 there is a straighforward
relation between intertemporal welfare and cross-section pay o®s. In the example




dt = 0 holds in the steady state. The next
subsection shows that for more general cases the relationship is still tractible.
83.2. Welfare and income in the steady state
To further explore the implications of the proposition above, consider the following
{ fairly general { type of steady state:
De¯nition 3.3. A steady state (x;n) is de¯ned as a situation in which _ nt = _ xt =
0 and dWt
dt = f(x;n;Á)Wt for some function f(:) < ½.
This de¯nition generalises the concept used in most matching models (in fact
all models discussed in Mortensen and Pissarides (1998)) where f(:) ´ 0. In
the model of section 2 with growth, it is the case that f(:) equals the exogenous
growth rate g. The condition that f(:) < ½ is needed for stability reasons.







Proof. Equation (3.3) follows immediately from proposition 2.2 above and the
de¯nition for the steady state.
The interpretation is that in the steady state welfare is proportional to income
de¯ned as the sum of pay-o®s over all individuals. Hence, to calculate steady state
intertemporal welfare, only current variables need to be known.
Note that we allow for externalities in the sense that the actions of one in-
dividual might a®ect the pay-o®s of other agents, that is
@ps;t(xa;x¡a;Á)
@xa0 6= 0 for
a 6= a0. Hence, while the proposition shows how to appropriately measure actual
welfare, nothing need to be (nor can be) said about the maximal welfare level
at this stage. In contrast, most results in the "green accounting" literature only
apply to ¯rst best economies, as argued below.
In practice, it is sometimes possible to use equation (3.3) directly to ¯nd Wt.
For this the function f(:) needs to be identi¯ed3. This is straightforward in models
which have the property that the proportional rise in pay o®s is the same for all
states. That is, the growth rate of pay o®s equals
_ ps;t+¿
ps;t+¿ = f(x;n;Á). Indeed
this is a necessary condition for a steady state to exist, if x in equation (3.1)
in°uences the transition probabilities ms;s0. Since Wt is a weighted average of
3Trivially, Wt can be solved directly in cases where f(:) = 0.
9value functions, which are themselves some weighted average of per period pay







for some weights !s;t+¿, which depend on ns;t+¿, the transition probabilities ms;s0











Hence in such models the function f(:) can be identi¯ed and Wt can then be found
using equation (3.3).
Furthermore note that the model easily allows for heterogeneity. Consider Z
types of agents each of which can be in one of Sz states. For example a type I
agent has a higher transition probability from state s to s0 than a type II agent.
Similarly, pay-o®s may di®er among agents. We now have to reformulate the
model by de¯ning enough states s (by stacking the vectors for n, p, and V and
constructing a partitioned matrix for the transition probabilities). In particular,
there are
P
z2Z Sz states and agents can move between states within their own
type but not between types.
3.3. Does a rise in income mean higher welfare?
Finally, consider the case where Á is changed to examine whether cross-section and
intertemporal steady state welfare move in the same direction. The motivation
for this proposition is that the e®ect of a change in Á on cross-section pay o®s
may be more easily determined (either because it can be more readily observed
in practice or because it is analitically simpler to derive) than the e®ect of Á on
intertemporal welfare. However, it is not always true that a rise in income due
to a change in Á implies a rise in welfare. In the private outcome there is no
reason to suppose that this is the case. But even in the social optimum this is
not necessarily the case.
Proposition 3.5. In a steady state social optimum, a change in Á moves steady














10Proof. In social optimum dWt










































The condition in the proposition has the following interpretation. A change in
Á moves steady state intertemporal welfare in the same direction as cross- section
pay o®s if Á changes per period pay o®s and the growth rate f(:) in the same
direction. There is, however, no reason to expect the condition to hold a priori.
Hence, whenever we observe a rise in income (pay-o®s), there is no reason to
expect a rise in intertemporal welfare despite the proportionality between welfare
and income. This is obvious in an imperfect market economy with uninternalized
externalities, because then dWt
dx = 0 no longer holds. The proposition shows that
even in the social optimum this caveat applies. A change in parameters might
simultaneously change pay-o®s and the factor of proportionality between welfare
and income.
4. Green Accounting
Green accounting literature studies how income-related indexes can be constructed
to measure welfare (see Aronsson and Loefgren (1998) for a clear survey). The
central result of this literature, which goes back to Weitzman (1976), is that in an
economy that follows the ¯rst-best optimal path and experiences no technolog-
ical change, welfare is proportional to the current value Hamiltonian which can
be interpreted as net national income. The useful implication of this result is
that in such an economy observable market data can be used to construct the in-
tertemporal welfare index. However, once technological change and uninternalized
externalities play a role, the central result breaks down: welfare is proportional
to the current value Hamiltonian augmented by terms representing future tech-
nological changes or future external e®ects. Hence, in this more realistic case, the
suggested construction of the welfare index requires knowledge of future variables.
In addition, the current value Hamiltonian no longer corresponds to net national
income data, since in the presence of externalities, market prices no longer re°ect
the shadow prices of the maximization problem for which the Hamiltonian is for-
mulated. Intuitively, the Hamiltonian re°ects maximization of utility which does
not take place in the economy under consideration because of externalities.
11This section shows, ¯rst, that our approach solves for these two problems,
although we can only do so in the steady state. The key to our solution is that
we do not start from the ¯rst-best economy and try to correct for externalities
and growth, but that we directly start from the distorted economy. In particular,
equation (3.3) de¯nes the welfare index that can be applied directly to distorted
economies (as well as to ¯rst-best economies). Second, we apply our last propo-
sition to show that even if green accounting is possible, that is even if we can
construct welfare measures from observable data, the resulting ¯gures are in gen-
eral misleading when welfare comparisons are made, essentially because the factor
of proportionality between income and welfare might change as a result of shifts
in policy.4
Consider a model where increases in pollution adversely a®ect productivity
and/or utility by reducing payo®s in the S states where agents are active. In
particular, assume that all payo®s depend directly on agents' actions x, to be in-
terpreted as polluting inputs, and on an aggregate index of environmental quality
Q:
ps = Q¼s(xa;x¡a) (4.1)
Environmental quality deteriorates by the °ow of pollution which is related to
total use of polluting inputs in each state nsxs:
_ Q = ¡°g(n
Tx)Q (4.2)
where ° captures the overall extent of damage from economic activity. Individual
agents exert a negligible in°uence on environmental quality and take Q as given,
which gives rise to a pollution externality.
Exogenous productivity shocks cause agents to move from one state to another.
That is, we assume that the states represent productivity states (for instance,
for given xa and x¡a it is the case that ¼s(xa;x¡a) is increasing in s) and that
productivity shocks, modelled by mi;j;t, are exogenous and constant. We will show
that even with exogenous transition probabilities there is no reason to believe that
cross-section pay o®s and steady state intertemporal welfare move in the same
direction.
In the steady state _ n = 0; _ x = 0, _ ps=ps = _ Q=Q = ¡°g. Hence, the value
associated to each state declines at rate _ Q=Q = ¡°g, i.e. _ V = ¡°gV. From the
4To apply our approach to practical problems, we need valuation techniques to ¯nd appro-
priate shadow prices (e.g. Peskin and Peskin 1976), that is, to translate °ows observed in the
market into payo®s, and we need to know the f(:) function.
12de¯nition of welfare, we ¯nd _ W = _ nTV + nT _ V = ¡°gW. Hence, the steady
state satis¯es our de¯nition of the steady state with f(:) = ¡°g(nx) and from







Intertemporal income is proportional to current income
PS
s=1nsps, but the factor
of proportionality is smaller the larger the adverse e®ect of pollution is (i.e. the
larger °g is).5
Now consider what happens to income and welfare if ° increases, that is if
pollution becomes more damaging. First, consider the distorted market economy
where pollution (learning) externalities are not internalized. Agents choose x so
as to maximize pay o®s, taking Q as given. Hence, a change in ° does not a®ect x
and pay o®s remain una®ected. So is the steady state distribution over sectors n
which depends on exogenous parameters mi;j only. Hence, income is una®ected.
However, welfare declines, see the formula above. We may conclude that in the
market economy welfare and income diverge, which comes at no surprise given
the presence of externalities.
Second, consider the ¯rst-best economy. Optimal choice of polluting inputs
requires that the marginal contribution of polluting inputs to pay o®s relative to







A change in ° does not a®ect the ¯rst-best choice of actions x. Hence income in
the ¯rst-best economy is also una®ected by an increase in °, while welfare falls
due to such an increase. Hence, also in the ¯rst-best economy, welfare and income
diverge.
5An alternative interpretation is that Q represents total factor productivity and that equa-
tion (4.2) represents learning-by-doing, that is cumulative production determines total factor
productivity. The parameter ° is a spillover parameter that links sectoral activity to economiy-
wide learning. Individual agents do not internalize and take Q as given. In this interpretation,
¡°g represents the rate of (sectoral-neutral) technological progress. Accordingly, the welfare to
income ratio 1
½¡(¡°g) becomes larger if technological progress accrues more rapidly.
135. Conclusions
We have explored how welfare and income are related in a class of stochastic
models. We have found a useful formula relating welfare and income in the steady
state. This formula allows easy calculations of steady state welfare in certain
types of models that are frequently used in the literature, such as Frederiksson and
Holmlund (1999), Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995) and these surveyed by Mortensen
and Pissarides (1998).
We have also pointed out some conclusions for green accounting. Although
welfare and income are related in the steady state, it seems unlikely that we may
exploit this knowledge in practice to infer changes in welfare from changes in
national income as recorded in national accounts. We have pointed out that even
in our simple set-up unobservable parameter changes cause welfare and income to
diverge even in a ¯rst-best economy. This result is likely to carry over to more
complex settings, notably settings in which capital accumulation matters (which
was ignored in our analysis), and to an analysis of the relationship between income
and welfare outside the steady state.
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